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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

MARK DERON HARRISON,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 890617-CA
Priority No. 2

:

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In addition to relying on and reasserting the contents of
his opening brief, Mr. Harrison replies to the State's brief as
follows:
The prosecutor's peremptory challenges of Ms. Gomez and
Ms. Rezendez require reversal of Mr. Harrison's conviction.

While

the record relating to the timing of the objection to the peremptory
challenges is not clear, under the governing law, this Court should
reach the merits of the issue.

The adequacy of the prima facie case

triggering the prosecutor's explanation of the challenges is moot
because the prosecutor explained his challenges.

The prosecutor's

explanation of the challenges was not related to the facts of the
case or legitimate, and Mr. Harrison is therefore entitled to a new
trial.

In the alternative, the record of all facts and

circumstances demonstrates that prosecutor's discriminatory intent
and requires that Mr. Harrison receive a new trial.
Mr. Harrison should have been allowed to present a concrete
explanation of why he made a practice of carrying a gun, and to

support his testimony that he was carrying the gun all night long to
protect himself and did not retrieve it in the midst of the disputes
with Grant Glover7s group with the intent to shoot Mr. Glover.

The

importance of this evidence to Mr. Harrison's defense, which he is
constitutionally entitled to present, outweighs the remote
possibility that the jurors might have been confused by this
evidence.
Similarly, Mr. Harrison should have been allowed to present
to the jurors the preliminary hearing testimony of John Bray
concerning whether Mr. Harrison had said that he was going home to
retrieve his gun in the midst of the disputes with Grant Glover's
group.

The fact that Mr. Bray's trial and preliminary hearing

testimony on this issue is so confusing is not reason to keep it
from the jurors, whose function is always to resolve confusing
relevant evidence.
The prosecutor's comments on Mr. Harrison's exercise of his
marital privilege, right against self-incrimination, attorney client
privilege, and other comments were improper and prejudicial to
Mr. Harrison's case.
The gun seized from the Harrison diaper bag should have
been suppressed.

Mr. Harrison had a legitimate privacy interest in

the bag and a property interest in the gun.

The search cannot be

justified by the State's belated characterization of the search as
"incident to arrest."

The pat down search of the diaper bag did not

occur when the diaper bag with the gun zipped in the inner pocket
was within the scope of Mr. or Mrs. Harrison's control.

- 2
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I.
THE PROSECUTOR'S PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
REQUIRE A NEW TRIAL IN THIS CASE.
In response to Mr. Harrison's argument that he was denied
equal protection of the law when the prosecutor's explanation of his
peremptory challenge demonstrated, rather than negated, group bias,1
the State responds:

(1) the claim was waived because the objection

was raised after the jury was sworn,2 and (2) Mr. Harrison failed to
make a prima facie case of discrimination requiring an explanation
from the prosecutor.3

A.

THIS COURT SHOULD REACH THE MERITS OF THE ISSUE.

1. The record on the timing of the objection is
unclear.
The apparent basis of the State's waiver argument is its
apparent perception that the objection to the peremptory challenge
followed the swearing in of the jurors.4
The record relating to this issue is ambiguous, and the
pertinent transcript pages are included in Appendix 1 to this
brief.
On page 74, the transcript indicates that the jurors were
given the oath and impanelled (T. 74 lines 11 and 12). It appears,
however, that defense counsel interrupted, "Judge Young [sic]:

1

Appellant's opening brief at 12 through 18.

2

Appellee's brief at 7-8.

3

Appellee's brief at 8-10.

4

Appellee's brief at 7-8.
- 3

-

Your

Honor, may we approach the bench before you proceed with this?"
(T. 74 lines 14 and 15). In chambers, the court then indicated,
"The record may show that we're again convened prior to the
impanelling of the final jury at the request of the defense to make
objections as to the method of the State in exercising its
challenges" (T. 75 lines 3 through 6).

At the conclusion of the

chambers discussions, the court then had the jurors stand and asked
the parties if the jurors standing were those selected, and
indicated that they had already received the oath (T. 79 lines 4
through 11). The court then dismissed the potential jurors who were
not selected and seated the jurors (T. 79 lines 12 through 19).
Because the court reporter did not transcribe the oath of
the jurors, it cannot be determined if defense counsel's objection
occurred during the swearing in of the jurors.

The indication in

the transcript that the jurors were sworn and impanelled, followed
by the trial court's indication that the objection in chambers was
occurring prior to the impanelling of the jurors, gives further
cause to question the adequacy of the transcript supporting the
waiver argument.
The absence of an objection by the State on the grounds of
timeliness and the uncertainty in the record are reason enough for
this Court to reject the State's waiver argument.

Cf. Salt Lake

County v. Carlston, 776 P.2d 653 (Utah 1989) (objections must be
raised so that record on appeal is adequate to facilitate appellate
review of circumstances surrounding peremptory challenges).

- 4

2. The governing law indicates that the objection
was timely.
In arguing that the issue concerning the prosecutor's
peremptory challenges was waived, the State relies primarily on Utah
Code Ann. section 78-46-16, which reads,
(1) Within seven days after the moving party
discovered, or by the exercise of diligence could
have discovered the grounds therefore, and in any
event before the trial jury is sworn to try the
case, a party may move to stay the proceedings or
to quash an indictment, or for other appropriate
relief, on the ground of substantial failure to
comply with this act in selecting a grand or
trial jury.
(3) The procedures prescribed by this
section are the exclusive means by which a person
accused of a crime, the state, or a party in a
civil case may challenge a jury on the ground
that the jury was not selected in conformity with
this act.
(emphasis added).
While the record in this case is not clear as to whether
the objection occurred before the jurors were completely sworn in,
even if the objection followed the swearing in of the jurors, the
Jury Selection Act does not bar this Court's reviewing the
prosecutor's peremptory challenges.

In State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d

546 (Utah 1987), the court explicitly recognized that challenges to
jury selection that are not based on the Utah Jury Selection Act are
not governed by the act.

Id. at 574 n.115.

Thus, Utah Code Ann.

section 78-46-16 does not govern the timeliness of Mr. Harrison's
constitutional challenge to the peremptory challenges.
The State also relies on State v. Bankhead, 727 P.2d 216
(Utah 1986), for the proposition that the issue was waived.

- 5
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While

Bankhead purports to apply section 78-46-16 to a constitutional
challenge to jury selection, the opinion is a per curiam decision
preceding Tillman, in which the court reached the merits of the
constitutional issue, although the objection was raised after the
jury was sworn.

Bankhead, 727 P.2d at 217-218.

The State also relies on People v. Harris. 542 N.Y.S.2d 411
(A.D. 1989), in which the court decided that while the issue was not
raised prior to the swearing in of the jurors, because Batson had
not been published at the time the objection was made, the court
would reach the merits of the issue and reverse the conviction.
at 412.

Id,

Prior to doing so, the court explained the purpose of the

waiver rule:
The purpose of requiring a prompt objection to
the discriminatory exercise of peremptory
challenges is to permit the court to conduct a
hearing at the earliest opportunity while matters
are fresh in the minds of the participants,
especially the Trial Judge. Further, requiring
that the objection be made before the jury is
finally sworn will prevent any delay in starting
the trial if a new venire must be drawn.
Id. at 411-412.
The objection and analysis in the instant case occurred
while the events were still fresh in the minds of the parties and
trial court and prior to the dismissal of the stricken jurors.5

5

In the event that the trial court had found racial
discrimination in the instant case, it might have been entirely
appropriate to begin jury selection with a fresh panel, regardless
of whether the first jury was sworn or not. See Batson v. Kentucky,
476 U.S. 79, 99 n.24 (the proper remedy for a finding of
discrimination in jury selection might be dismissal of the jury
venire and selection of jurors from a new panel).

- 6
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Reference to this Court's opinion in Salt Lake County v.
Carlston, 776 P.2d 653 (Utah App. 1989), further demonstrates that
it is appropriate for this Court to address the merits of the
issue.

Mr. Harrison's liberty is at stake and he did not delay the

objection to sandbag his prosecution.

See Carlston at 655 n.5

(indicating that when liberty is at stake, constitutional issues may
be addressed for the first time on appeal) and at 656 (parties
should not acquiesce in impanelling of jury and wait to object until
the case is decided against them).

The objection was made prior to

the dismissal of the stricken jurors.

See Carlston at 656 (citing

several cases rejecting as untimely objections raised after
prospective jurors are dismissed).

Finally, in this case, the

prosecutor explained his peremptory challenges and the trial court
ruled on the issue, facilitating this Court's appellate review of
the issue.

Compare Carlston at 656 ("Failure to make a timely

objection to the exercise of peremptory challenges defeats Batson's
requirement that their validity be determined first by the trial
judge on the evidence presented, id., deprives the accused attorney
of the opportunity to present evidence of any constitutionally
permissible reasons for challenges to the venire members, and leaves
the appellate court with no factual basis in the record on which to
conduct a meaningful review.").
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B. BECAUSE THE PROSECUTOR EXPLAINED THE PEREMPTORY
CHALLENGES, THE ADEQUACY OF THE PRIMA FACIE CASE
TRIGGERING THE PROSECUTOR'S DUTY TO EXPLAIN IS MOOT.
The arguments concerning the adequacy of the prima facie
case of discrimination6 are academic in light of the practical
approach to burdens of proof adopted by the Batson court.

In

footnote 18 of Batson, the Court indicated that the operation of the
burden of proof rules in these cases is explained in several cases
decided under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

One of the

cases specifically cited by the Batson Court in footnote 18 is
United States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S.
711 (1983).
In Aikens, the lower court and both had parties focused on
whether the plaintiff had made a prima facie case of
discrimination.

The Court indicated that framing the issue in such

a manner was not appropriate:
Because this case was fully tried on the merits,
it is surprising to find the parties and the
Court of Appeals still addressing the question
whether Aikens made out a prima facie case. We
think that by framing the issue in these terms,
they have unnecessarily evaded the ultimate
question of discrimination vel non.
The prima facie case method established in McDonnell
Douglas was "never intended to be rigid, mechanized,
or ritualistic. Rather, it is merely a sensible,
orderly way to evaluate the evidence in light of
common experience as it bears on the critical
question of discrimination." Where the defendant
has done everything that would be required of him if

6

Appellee's brief at 8 through 10. Mr. Harrison's
appellate counsel, Elizabeth Holbrook, was the first to address this
moot point, Appellant's brief at 13-14, and regrets the error.

- 8
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the plaintiff had properly made out a prima facie
case, whether the plaintiff really did so is no
longer relevant. The district court has before
it all the evidence it needs to decide whether
"the defendant intentionally discriminated
against the plaintiff."
Id. at 715 (citations omitted, emphasis added).
In the instant case, because the prosecutor explained his
peremptory challenges, Mr. Harrison's having presented a prima facie
case is no longer an issue before this Court.

C. THE STATE'S OBJECTIONS TO THE PRIMA FACIE CASE
ARE UNDULY FORMALISTIC.
In its discussion of the "prima facie case," the State
presents an unduly cramped reading of the record in this case and
governing precedents.

While the issue of the "prima facie case" is

moot at this point, Mr. Harrison will address the State's discussion
for purposes of thoroughness.

1.

The record is adequate to establish that

Ms. Gomez and Ms. Rezendez are racial minorities.
Contrary to the State's claim that the record does not
demonstrate that Ms. Gomez and Ms. Rezendez are racial minorities
(referring to the adequacy of the prima facie case), 7 the transcript
reflects that the trial court recognized that they are racial
minorities, stating, "I would also indicate to you that it does
appear to me that there are minorities in this panel [other] than
7

Appellee's brief at 9

- 9

-

simply Mrs. Gomez....And Mrs. Rezendez, R-E-Z-E-N-D-E-Z, appears,
likewise, to be potentially a hispanic without us going into that
question further."

(T. 70).

Other cases demonstrate the adequacy of the record in the
instant case.

See e.g., State v. Cantu, 750 P.2d 591f 596-597 (Utah

1988) (challenged juror, a native-born American, did not consider
himself a minority, conceded that he was Hispanic when pressed on
the point; there was no evidence that he appeared or sounded
Hispanic; "Hispanics or Spanish-surnamed persons are a 'cognizable
racial group7 for purposes of equal protection analysis under
Batson.").
In light of the purposes behind Batson—to protect jurors
from racial harassment, to inculcate confidence in the fairness of
the criminal justice system, and to stop prosecutors from acting on
racial perceptions, see Batson, 476 U.S. at 87; Holland v. Illinois,
493 U.S.

, 107 L.Ed.2d 905, 922 (Kennedy, J., concurring), 927

(Marshall, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan and Blackmun, JJ.), 934
(Stevens, J., dissenting), 110 S.Ct.

(1990)—proof of a juror's

ostensible race is adequate and should not be replaced with a
detailed inquiry into and proof of a juror's race.

2. Mr. Harrison's race should not determine his
eligibility to challenge the prosecutor's
discriminatory exercise of peremptory challenges.
In arguing that the trial court's ruling can be upheld
because Mr. Harrison does not share the race of the stricken jurors
(again referring to the adequacy of the prima facie case), the State

- 10 -

cites several cases requiring racial identity between jurors
stricken and those raising an equal protection claim.8
Persuasive reasons why a defendant's race should not
determine whether a prosecutor may challenge potential jurors on
account of their race are found in the recent decision, Holland v.
Illinois, 493 U.S.

, 107 L.Ed.2d 905, 110 S.Ct.

(1990).

Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion states:
To bar the claim whenever the defendant's race is
not the same as the juror's would be to concede
that racial exclusion of citizens from the duty,
and honor, of jury service will be tolerated, or
even condoned. We cannot permit even the
inference that this principle will be accepted,
for it is inconsistent with the equal
participation in civic life that the Fourteenth
Amendment guarantees . . . Batson is based in
large part on the right to be tried by a jury
whose members are selected by nondiscriminatory
criteria and on the need to preserve public
confidence in the jury system. These are not
values shared only by those of a particular
color; they are important to all criminal
defendants.
Holland, 107 L.Ed.2d 922.
The dissenting opinion of Justice Marshall, joined by
Justices Brennan and Blackmun, further explains the bases of the
Batson decision, which appear to be unrelated to the race of the
defendant:
The fundamental principle undergirding the
decision in Batson was that "a 'State's purposeful
or deliberate denial to Negroes on account of race
of participation as jurors in the administration of
justice violates the Equal Protection Clause./ff
This principle, Justice Powell explained for the

8

Appellee's brief at 10

- 11 -

Court, has three bases: the right of the
defendant "to be tried by a jury whose members
are selected pursuant to nondiscriminatory
criteria"; the right of a member of the
community not to be assumed incompetent for and
be excluded from jury service on account of his
race7 and the need to preserve "public
confidence in the fairness of our system of
justice[.]"
Id, at 924 (citations omitted).

The dissenting opinion of Justice

Stevens explains a similar rationale:
Our decision in Batson was based on the
conclusion that "[r]acial discrimination in the
selection of jurors harms not only the accused
whose life or liberty they are summoned to try,"
but also "the excluded juror." "Selection
procedures that purposefully exclude black
persons from juries undermine public confidence
in the fairness of our system of justice."
Batson was a black citizen, but he had no
interest in serving as a juror and thus was not a
member of the excluded class. His standing to
vindicate the interests of the potential black
jurors was based on his status as a defendant.
Indeed, the suggestion that only defendants of
the same race or ethnicity as the excluded jurors
can enforce the jurors' right to equal treatment
and equal respect recognized in Batson is itself
inconsistent with the central message of the
Equal Protection Clause.
. . . [W]hile the inference that the
discriminatory motive is at work is stronger when
the excluded jurors are of the same race or
ethnicity as the defendant, the discriminatory
use of peremptory challenges is not limited to
that situation but may be present when, as here,
the excluded jurors are not of the same race as
the defendant.
Id. at 934 (citations omitted).
In the event that the United States Supreme Court erects a
same-race rule in federal equal protection peremptory challenge
cases, such a rule would seem to violate basic tenets of Utah law.

- 12 -

For example, Article I section 24 of the Utah Constitution provides,
"All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation."

In

Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661 (Utah 1984), the court recognized that
this constitutional provision was specifically designed to combat
the arbitrary exercise of government power.

Id. at 670.

Erection

of a same-race rule would facilitate the arbitrary exercise of
government power, allowing even the most blatant cases of racial
discrimination to stand unexamined, as long as those cases involve
the racial disparity between the defendant and the jurors.

Further,

Utah Code ann. section 78-46-16 provides, "A citizen shall not be
excluded or exempt from jury service on account of race, color,
religion, sex, national origin, or economic status."

The Utah Jury

Selection Act is apparently applicable regardless of the race of the
defendant being tried.
In short, if the same-race element of the prima facie case
were an issue properly before this Court, it would properly be
resolved in favor of Mr. Harrison, the stricken jurors, and the
justice system.

D. THE TRIAL COURT'S TOLERANCE OF THE PROSECUTOR'S
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE WAS LEGALLY INCORRECT.
In United States Postal Service Board of Governors v.
Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 (1983), discussed supra at 8-9, one of the
cases suggested by the Batson Court as a guide to the procedure of
the inquiry, see Batson 476 U.S. at 94, n.18, the Court proceeded to
explain the proper inquiry once there is an explanation of the

- 13 -

allegedly discriminatory conduct:
On the state of the record at the close of
the evidence, the District Court in this case
should have proceeded to this specific question
directly[.] . . . As we stated in [Texas
Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450
U.S. 248 (1981)]:
"The plaintiff retains the burden of
persuasion . . . [H]e may succeed in this
either directly by persuading the court that
a discriminatory reason more likely
motivated the employer or indirectly by
showing that the employer's proffered
explanation is unworthy of credence." 450
U.S., at 256[.]
Id. at 715-716 (citations omitted).
As directed by Aikens, this Court should proceed to
determine whether the prosecutor's claim that he exercised the
peremptory challenges with an eye to equal gender representation is
worthy of credence, or, in the alternative, whether the record as a
whole establishes that the peremptory challenges were racially
motivated.

1. The prosecutor's explanation was lacking in
credibility and facially inadequate.
The trial court apparently accepted at face value the
prosecutor's explanation that the peremptory challenges of Ms. Gomez
and Ms. Rezendez were exercised on the basis of gender, rather than
race (T. 78). As noted in Mr. Harrison's opening brief, however, if
the prosecutor were actually seeking a "gender-balanced" jury, it is
curious that the prosecutor used his first peremptory challenge to
remove a man when there were eight women and seven men to choose

- 14 -

from.9
In addition to lacking credibility, the prosecutor's
explanation10 was not "neutral," "reasonably specific," "related to
the case being tried," or "legitimate."11

This case involves no

facts requiring a certain number of male and female jurors, and even
if it did, exercising peremptory challenges on the basis of gender
is never legitimate.

Constitution of Utah, Article IV section 1.

Because the trial court erroneously accepted the
prosecutor's inadequate explanation of the challenges, Mr. Harrison
is entitled to a new trial.

Cantu, 778 P.2d at 519.

2. Other evidence of the prosecutor's
discriminatory intent calls for a new trial.
As an alternative to proving the inadequacy of the
prosecutor's explanation, there is evidence of the prosecutor's
discriminatory intent, which the trial court failed to acknowledge.

9

Appellant's brief at 16.

10

The prosecutor's explanation was that he wanted a
gender balanced jury and that Ms. Gomez was the woman he "liked the
least", and that "for whatever reason", he preferred jurors other
than Ms. Rezendez (T. 75-77).
11

See State v. Cantu, 778 P.2d 517, 518 (Utah 1989)
("Relying on Batson, it has been found that an explanation given by
a prosecutor for the exercise of a peremptory challenge must be
(1) neutral, (2) related to the case being tried, (3) clear and
reasonably specific, and (4) legitimate.'") (citation omitted,
emphasis added).
12

The trial court's apparent bases for his conclusion
that there was no evidence of discrimination were that one of the
jurors, a Ms. Shelley, appeared to be "of some potential minority,"
and was as likely to be a minority as Ms. Rezendez, and that
Ms. Gomez was the only one appearing to be "assured of a minority
race" (T. 70, 78).
- 15 -

The prosecutor barely participated in the voir dire—he
asked the court to inquire which jurors had experience with firearms
(T. 41) and asked which Hardee's employed Ms. Gomez (she was not
employed by Hardees; her husband was) (T. 52). When the information
in the record about Ms. Gomez and Ms. Rezendez is compared with the
information about the other jurors, there is nothing unique about
Ms. Gomez and Ms. Rezendez that explains why they were stricken from
the jury.

See Appendix 2 to Appellant's opening brief.

The

prosecutor did not strike other female jurors who were seated on the
jury (T. 73-74).

The prosecutor's reason for striking Ms. Gomez and

Ms. Rezendez was unrelated to the facts of the case (T. 75-77). 13
Additionally, Mr. Harrison "is entitled to rely on the fact, as to
which there can be no dispute, that peremptory challenges constitute
a jury selection practice that permits 'those to discriminate who
are of a mind to discriminate."1

Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79,

96 (1986).
Thus, even if the trial court had been correct in accepting
the prosecutor's explanation, other evidence of the prosecutor's
discriminatory intent rendered the peremptory challenges
intolerable.

Mr. Harrison is entitled to a new trial.

Cantu, 778

P.2d at 519.

13

See State v. Cantu. 778 P.2d 517, 518-519 (Utah 1989)
(citing these factors as proper indicia of discrimination).
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II.
MR. HARRISON IS ENTITLED TO
A NEW TRIAL IN WHICH HIS CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS TO PRESENT HIS DEFENSE ARE HONORED.
In response to Mr. Harrison's claim that the trial court
violated his right to defend himself by blocking the presentation of
evidence concerning a previous incident with Crips explaining his
defensive practice of carrying a gun, and by blocking the
presentation of evidence of John Bray's inconsistent testimony
concerning whether Mr. Harrison retrieved his gun in the midst of
his confrontations with Grant Glover's group,14 the State responds:
(1) the evidence of the previous gang incident was irrelevant, and
may have confused the jury;15 (2) Mr. Harrison had an adequate
opportunity to explain why he carried a gun;16 and (3) presentation
of the John Bray's preliminary hearing testimony was an improper
mode of impeachment, and the testimony may have confused the jury.17

A. MR. HARRISON SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO PRESENT
THE EVIDENCE CONCERNING THE INCIDENT INVOLVING THE
FIREBOMBING AND DEATH THREAT.
Mr. Harrison agrees that the firebombing and death threat
incident was not relevant to the danger posed by Grant Glover at the
Persepolis Restaurant.18

It was, however, relevant to show that

14

Appellant's opening brief at 18 through 23.

15

Appellee's brief at 11-12.

16

Appellee's brief at 13.

17

Appellee's brief at 13-14.

18

Appellee's brief at 11-12.
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Mr. Harrison was carrying his gun all night long for purposes of
self-protection, and, contrary to the State's contention, did not
retrieve the gun in the middle of the disputes with Grant Glover's
group in order to shoot Grant Glover.
The State's speculations that the jury may have been
confused into deliberating about the firebombing and death threat
incident, rather than Grant Glover's death, or that the jury may
have perceived a connection between the events with "a Black person"
(Grant Glover) in April and the events with the "Tongans" in April
at "a totally different location and under different
circumstances,"19 are unlikely.

More important, the speculations

are outweighed by Mr. Harrison's rights to defend himself in court.
The State notes that the Court allowed Mr. Harrison to
testify that he carried a gun all night that night because he had
been threatened and because "things" had happened to him in the
past.20

The patent callousness and incredibility of such a vague

excuse for carrying a loaded firearm in the crowded Persepolis
restaurant further demonstrates why Mr. Harrison should have been
allowed to present the actual incident causing him to carry a gun.

19

Appellee's brief at 11 through 13.

20

Appellee's brief at 13.
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B. MR. HARRISON SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO PRESENT
THE EVIDENCE CONCERNING MR. BRAY'S INCONSISTENT
TESTIMONY CONCERNING WHETHER MR. HARRISON RETRIEVED
THE GUN DURING THE DISPUTES WITH MR. GLOVER.
The State first notes that the trial court found the
preliminary hearing testimony consistent with Mr. Bray's trial
testimony, and then indicates that because the preliminary hearing
testimony is confusing, the trial court was acting within its
discretion in excluding the preliminary hearing testimony.21
Mr. Bray's trial testimony and preliminary hearing testimony are
both confusing.

See Appendix 3 to Appellant's opening brief.

The

jurors may fairly have concluded, however, that Mr. Bray's
preliminary hearing testimony that Mr. Harrison never told Mr. Bray
that he was going to get a gun (page 2 of Exhibit 25-D lines 3
through 5) was inconsistent with Mr. Bray's trial testimony that
Mr. Harrison said that he was going to get a gun before they left
the Persepolis (T. 267 lines 9 through 11). The confusion in
Mr. Bray's trial and preliminary hearing testimony on this crucial
issue should have been resolved by the factfinders in this case, the
jury.
The State indicates that reading the preliminary hearing
transcript to the jurors was not the proper mode of presenting the
testimony to the jurors, and that defense counsel should have gone
through the statements with Mr. Bray line by line.22

while defense

counsel made a diligent effort to discuss the testimony with

21

Appellee's brief at 14.

22

Appellee's brief at 14.
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Mr. Bray, who was apparently confused or uncooperative (see
Appendix 3 to Appellant's opening brief), she was not limited to
that mode of impeachment.

There is no rule of evidence precluding

reading the preliminary hearing testimony to the jurors.23

III.
THE PROSECUTOR'S MISCONDUCT
DENIED MR. HARRISON A FAIR TRIAL.
A.

MARITAL PRIVILEGE

The State's assertion that the prosecutor argued to the
trial court that statements made by Mrs. Harrison prior to the
marriage were admissible in evidence is not supported by a citation
to the record.24

Mr. Harrison's appellate counsel is unable to

locate such an argument in the transcript.25

23

Utah Rule of Evidence 613 provides: "(a) In examining a
witness concerning a prior statement made by him, whether written or
not, the statement need not be shown nor its contents disclosed to
him at that time, but on request the same shall be shown or
disclosed to opposing counsel. (b) Extrinsic evidence of a prior
inconsistent statement by a witness is not admissible unless the
witness is afforded an opportunity to explain or deny the same and
the opposite party is afforded an opportunity to interrogate him
thereon, or the interests of justice otherwise require. This
provision does not apply to admissions of a party-opponent as
defined in Rule 801(d)(2).
24

Appellee's brief at 16.

25

But see M.H. 7, 67-70, where the prosecutor argued that
under Utah Rules of Evidence 804(a) and (b)(5), Mrs. Harrison's
preliminary hearing testimony would be admissible.
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The State's argument that the prosecutor correctly
addressed communications occurring prior to the marriage26 overlooks
the fact that prior to the solemnization of the Harrison marriage,
the Harrisons were married under the common law.

At the preliminary

hearing, the prosecutor sought to call Mrs. Harrison as a witness,
and the magistrate began to evaluate whether the Harrisons were
married at common law.

See Utah Code Ann. section 30-1-4.5 (listing

criteria for common law marriage and indicating that a marriage may
be recognized as a valid common law marriage at any time during the
marriage or within one year following the termination of the
marriage).

Prior to a ruling from the magistrate, the prosecutor

withdrew his request to have Mrs. Harrison testify (M.H. 68; R. 3).
Regardless of the propriety of the prosecutor's questions
about the actual communications between the Harrisons, the closing
argument directly violated the marital privilege.

The State

concedes that the prosecutor's closing argument comment on
Mr. Harrison's marital privilege was improper.27

26

Appellee's brief at 16-20.

27

The prosecutor argued, "Instruction No. 10. This is a
very interesting one. A married person may not be forced to testify
in any criminal action against their spouse. What's the assistance
of that? Well, there is a preliminary hearing of this matter on the
17th of May and the defendant gets married in July. And the trial
is in August. Isn't it interesting that one of the two people who
got told about the gun in the waistband was the wife who can't
testify?" (T. 640) (emphasis added).
Appellee's concession of error is apparently limited to the
language emphasized above. Appellee's brief at 20.
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After noting that the trial court erroneously denied the
objection to this comment, the State asserts that the comment was
not prejudicial because there was another witness who was told about
the gun in the waistband who did not testify and because other
witnesses had not been told about the gun.28

Mr. Harrison's

appellate counsel is unable to ascertain to whom the prosecutor was
referring when he mentioned the other person who had been told about
the gun in the waistband but did not testify, if such a person was
referred to in evidence at all.

It is difficult to imagine how the

existence of any "other person" or the fact that other witnesses had
not been told about the gun would cure the prejudice caused by the
prosecutor's drawing attention to the fact that Mrs. Harrison, who
was repeatedly identified in court as a spectator during the trial
(e.g. T. 93, 145, 192), did not testify in support of her husband
because of the marital privilege.

B.

PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION.

The State argues that Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976),
which forbids the impeachment use of a defendant's silence after
arrest and Miranda warnings, does not apply to the prosecutor's
references to Mr. Harrison's failure to speak with the police,
because there is no evidence that Mr. Harrison was silent.29

28

Appellee's brief at 20.

29

Appellee's brief at 22-24.
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While Mr. Harrison may not have invoked his right to remain silent,
and while Mr. Harrison may have spoken with the police after he was
arrested and prior to trial, the clear implication of the
prosecutor's closing argument was that Mr. Harrison remained
silent.
The closing argument began with a prosecutor's apology to
the jurors concerning the supposedly overly detailed manner in which
the State had presented its case.

He explained the length of the

State's case by detailing the investigating officer's task in
putting this case together, discussing how the various witnesses
were identified and located and discussing the evolution of the case
in the investigator's mind (T. 632-634).

During the prosecutor's

reconstruction of the case, he made no mention of Mr. Harrison's
speaking with the police (T. 632-634).

As the culmination of this

argument, the prosecutor stated:
Finally Mr. Harrison said, yeah, that's
true. For the first time on the stand he said
yep, I pulled the trigger. It was me. What
Detective Johnson has known, believed all along,
you have confirmed so easily. The defendant
said, Yep, I pulled the trigger.
Well, why do we have to go through all that
work? Why do we have to bring in a doctor and
prove that Grant Glover was dead? Why did we
have to bring in a ballistics guy to talk about
the bullet? Why did we have to have John Bray
come in here and say my friend shot him? Because
until this man admitted it we had the burden of
proving it. We have to be ready to prove it from
the very beginning of the trial, not the middle.
And for that, the State apologizes, but it's this
representative of the State's job to make sure
that everything possible is covered so that there
is no doubt and that that proof beyond a
reasonable doubt is established from the very

- 23 -

beginning of the trial and not just in the
middle, because you see, the defendant has no
obligation to say anything at all.
(T. 634-635).
If the prosecutor's closing argument concerning
Mr. Harrison's post-arrest silence was not based in fact, additional
concerns about the ethical performance of the prosecutor arise.

See

State v. Williams, 656 P.2d 450, 454 (Utah 1982) ("A prosecutor may
not assert arguments he knows to be inaccurate.").
The State's claim that the objection to the prosecutor's
question, "Did you make any efforts through any means whatsoever to
let the police know that the other man had a gun?", was that the
question "assumed that defendant would entreat others to tell the
police that there was a gun"30 does not make sense.

When the

prosecutor asked the aforementioned question and defense counsel
objected on "the same grounds previously made" (T. 506), it appears
that she was referring to the objection discussed at the bench
conference after the prosecutor asked, "Isn't it true that the first
time that anyone on the prosecution side has ever heard anything
about a gun, as far as you know, is yesterday when you testified
about it?" (T. 504). The fact that the bench conference was not
recorded is not fairly held against Mr. Harrison.

See State v.

Suarez, 793 P.2d 934, 936, nn. 3 and 5 (Utah App. 1990) (instructing
trial courts to have the bench conferences recorded).

30

Appellee's brief at 22.
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The State's argument that the jury would not construe the
questions as comments on Mr. Harrison's silence because his
invocation of his right to silence was not mentioned31 misses the
point of Doyle: "The point of the Doyle holding is that it is
fundamentally unfair to promise an arrested person that his silence
will not be used against him and thereafter to breach that promise
by using the silence to impeach his trial testimony."

Wainwriaht v.

Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 292 (1986).

C.

OTHER IMPROPER COMMENTS

The State ignores the case law governing comments
destroying the attorney client privilege,32 and seeks to justify
this and other improper comments of the prosecutor (for example, the
argument calling attention to the fact that Mr. Harrison had watched
the other witnesses testify and had an interest in being acquitted)
by noting that the comments made by the prosecutor may have occurred
to the jurors.33

The fact that the jurors may have made the same

assumptions the prosecutor argued does not justify the arguments,
which were fundamentally inconsistent with the presumption of
innocence.

See State v. Valdez, 513 P.2d 422, 426 (Utah 1973) ("The

test of whether the remarks made by counsel are so objectionable as
to merit a reversal in a criminal case is, [1] did the remarks call

31

Appellee's brief at 22-23.

32

See Appellant's opening brief at 29.

33

Appellee's brief at 27.
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to the attention of the jurors matters which they would not be
justified in considering in determining their verdict, and [2] were
they, under the circumstances of the particular case, probably
influence by those remarks.") (emphasis added).

IV.
BECAUSE IT WAS SEIZED IN VIOLATION OF MR. HARRISON'S
RIGHT AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES,
THE GUN SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED.
The State seeks to justify the improper search of the
Harrison's diaper bag and seizure of Mr. Harrison's gun 34 as a
search incident to arrest,35 and argues that Mr. Harrison has no
standing to object to the search of the diaper bag.36
The State argues that the trial court's statement,

fl

[T]he

court finds that the diaper bag was principally the property of
Ms. Yazzie, or Mrs. Harrison as she is known now," (M.H. 59) was a
finding that Mr. Harrison lacked standing to challenge the search of
the diaper bag and the seizure of his gun.37

That language of the

trial court was never tied to standing, nor was standing ever argued
by the prosecution.

See State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 887 (Utah

App. 1990) (prosecutor must give defendant notice "that he will be
put to his proof" on the standing issue).

The statement most likely

34

Appellant's opening brief at 33-38.

35

Appellee's brief at 30-32.

36

Appellee's brief at 29-30.

37

Appellee's brief at 29-30.
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refers to defense counsel's argument that the State should not have
resorted to seeking Mrs. Harrison's consent as a subterfuge to avoid
Mr. Harrison's assertion of his privacy rights in the bag and gun
(M.H. 52).
Assuming arguendo that the trial court's statement was a
finding that Mr. Harrison had no standing to challenge the search of
the bag because it was not his property (M.H. 59) , it was
inconsistent with recent opinions of the United States Supreme Court
demonstrating that privacy rights are not tied to ownership, but are
tied to reasonable expectations of privacy.

See e.g. O'Connor v.

Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987) (majority of the Court held that a state
employed doctor had a privacy interest in his office, and the entire
Court held that he had a privacy interest in his desk and cabinets);
Minnesota v. Olsen, No. 88-1916, 47 Cr.L 2031 (April 18,
1990) (Court recognized a privacy interest in property occupied by
overnight houseguests).
Mr. Harrison had not only a property interest in the gun
seized, but also a reasonable expectation of privacy in the family
diaper bag.
Defense counsel was the first to address the
inapplicability of the search incident to arrest theory as a
justification of the search in the instant case (M.H. 52, 55). The
prosecutor did not argue this theory, but relied on Mrs. Harrison's
consent (M.H. 56-57).

The trial court did not find that the

warrantless search was justified as a search incident to arrest, but
relied on Mrs. Harrison's consent (M.H. 59).
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At the time that Mr. and Mrs. Harrison were arrested and
the bag was patted down, Mr. and Mrs. Harrison were subdued by the
police and not proximate to the bag (Appellee's brief 28-29).

The

State did not present any evidence that the gun was within the scope
of Mr. or Mrs. Harrison's control, and hence, the search cannot be
justified as a search incident to arrest.

See Chimel v. California,

395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (arrestee's area of immediate control,
which may be searched in a valid search incident to arrest, is "the
area from within which [the arrestee] might gain possession of a
weapon or destructible evidence.11); State v. Arroyo. 137 Utah Adv.
Rep. 13, 15 (Utah 1990) (it is the State's burden to establish an
exception to the warrant requirement in seeking to submit evidence
seized in a warrantless search).

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Appellant Mark Harrison
respectfully requests that his conviction be reversed and the case
remanded to the trial court for a new trial.
SUBMITTED this V"£& day of October, 1990.

VERNICE S. AH CHING
3
//"
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

ELTZABETH HOLBRC
Attorney for' Defendant/Appellant

- 28 -

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, ELIZABETH HOLBROOK, hereby certify that eight copies of
the foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Court of Appeals, 400
Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, and
four copies to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this Vtfc day of October, 1990.

this

DELIVERED by
of October, 1990.
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APPENDIX 1

TRANSCRIPT OF
TIMING OF BATSON OBJECTION

IN C O U R T JURY S E L E C T I O N

I
I

JUDGE YOUNG:

I

LET ME ASK ONE FINAL QUESTION

4

j«LL ASK YOU TO PUT A MIRROR

f

YOU T H I S .

r

(CONTINUED)

IN FRONT OF YOUR FACE AND A S K

IF YOU WERE TO BE A C C U S E D OF AN O F F E N S E

THIS C O U R T AS M R . H A R R I S O N

NOW.

BEFORE

IS IS THERE ANY REASON WHY YOU

*

WOULD NOT W A N T S O M E O N E OF YOUR M I N D - S E T A N D

DISPOSITION

t
TO SIT IN J U D G M E N T OF YOU, IF SO, W O U L D YOU RAISE YOUR

HAND?

i
T H E R E A P P E A R S TO BE NO A F F I R M A T I V E

t

RESPONSE

TO

M l THAT Q U E S T I O N .
11 J
12

I W I L L ASK YOU, C O U N S E L ,
FOR CAUSE S U B J E C T TO THE D I S C U S S I O N

IF YOU PASS THE PANEL
IN

STATE D O E S , YOUR

CHAMBERS?

I*|

MR. COPE:

14

M S . L O Y : • THE D E F E N S E D O E S , YOUR

IS

JUDGE YOUNG:

THANK

HONOR.
HONOR.

YOU.

14

I

17

J FOR C A U S E BY B O T H C O U N S E L ; W H E R E U P O N , C O U N S E L

It
It

(WHEREUPON,

EXERCISED

THEIR P E R E M P T O R Y C H A L L E N G E S ; AND W H E R E U P O N , THE
JURORS W E R E

20
21

THE P R O S P E C T I V E J U R O R S WERE P A S S E D

FOLLOWING

SELECTED):
JUDGE YOUNG:

ALL R I G H T .

I'LL ASK THE CLERK

TO R E A D T H E N A M E S OF THE JURORS S E L E C T E D .

AND I'LL ASK

22
YOU, AS Y O U R NAME

IS R E A D , W O U L D YOU P L E A S E STAND AND

REMAIN

23
STANDING.
24
THE CLERK:
25 |

DWANLES B E N N E T T , JR.,
CAROL CAMBURN,
MARILYN W . R A S M U S S E N ,

73

TINA
ROBERT
ETHAN
GLORIA
JANIE

-.

JUDGE Y O U N G :

BALL,
FERRERI,
DELAVAN,
SHELLEY,
POULSON.

ALL R I G H T .

C O U N S E L , IS THIS T H E

$ I JURY THAT Y O U HAVE SELECTED?
j I

MR. COPE:

IT IS.

I I

MS. LOY:

fI

JUDGE YOUNG:

IT. IS, YOUR H O N O R .
W E ' L L _ A S K A L L OF Y O U TO R A I S E YOUR

)0 I SIGHT H A N D A N D R E C E I V E A N O A T H FROM THE C L E R K .
|t |

C W H E R E U P O N , THE JURORS WERE SWORN IN AND

12 I IMPANELED A T THIS T I M E )
tJ
14 I
15

JUDGE Y O U N G :

YOUR HQNOR, MAY W E APPROACH T H E

BENCH BEFORE YOU P R O C E E D WITH THIS?

t«

JUDGE Y O U N G :

YOU MAY.

1*

C W H E R E U P O N , A DISCUSSION BETWEEN COURT A N D

U

COUNSEL W A S HELD A T T H E BENCH, AFTER WHICH,. THE FOLLOWING

'•

PROCEEDINGS WERE HAD):

20
21

I

22

I UP W H I C H IS A M A T T E R O F LAW.

JUDGE Y O U N G :

WE HAVE A MATTER W E NEED TO TAKE
I W I L L ASK Y O U N O T TO L E A V E .

23

J U S T B E S E A T E D A N D R E M A I N IN THE SAME P O S I T I O N THAT YOU

24

I A R E , O B V I O U S L Y , A N D W E ' L L T A K E THE M A T T E R U P IN C H A M B E R S .

25

L

7

"

MOTION

JUDGE YOUNG:

9
5
f

IN CHAMBERS

THE RECORD MAY SHOW THAT WE'RE

AGAIN CONVENED PRIOR TO THE IMPANELING OF THE FINAL JURY
AT THE REQUEST OF THE DEFENSE TO MAKE OBJECTIONS AS TO THE
METHOD OF THE STATE IN EXERCISING ITS CHALLENGES.
MS. LOY:

1

THAT'S CORRECT, YOUR HONOR.

OUR MOTION

I | IS BASED UPON THE RECENT SUPREME COURT CASE OF MATSON.
| I AND I'M SORRY, I DON'T .REMEMBER THE TOTAL NAME.
M

THE COURT IS FAMILIAR WITH IT.

|| ] BELIEF THAT THE STRIKING

I'M SURE

BASICALLY, THAT IT IS OUR

OF TWO HISPANICS WHERE THERE ARE

12

TWO, THE ONLY TWO APPARENT OR POTENTIAL MINORITIES ON THE

||

PANEL, APPEARS TO BE A SYSTEMATIC EXCLUSION OF MINORITIES

14

FROM THE DEFENDANT'S JURY 9Y THE STATE'S PEREMPTORIES.

15

AND I BELIEVE THAT REQUIRES A SHOWING OF A RACIALLY

16

NEUTRAL REASON BY THE PROSECUTION WHEN THAT IS RAISED.

17

JUDGE YOUNG:

ALL RIGHT-

MR. COPE, THE QUESTION

l«

HAS BEEN RAISED IN RELATION TO YOUR CHALLENGE EXERCISED

19

AS NO. 3 T O — I ' M NOT SURE, IS IT MARY GOMEZ, JUROR NO. 7?

20

CAN YOU TELL US THE BASIS OF THAT AS TO WHY YOU EXERCISED

21 I THAT CHALLENGE?
22

MR. COPE:

YOUR HONOR, I STRUCK MS. GOMEZ ON

23

MY THIRD CHALLENGE NOT BECAUSE OF HER NAME OF "GOMEZ" OR

2*

BECAUSE SHE APPARED TO BE HISPANIC BUT BECAUSE SHE WAS A

25

WOMAN.

I WAS LABORING TO TRY AND GET A BALANCED PANEL.

75

I ALMOST SUCCEEDED.

AS THE COURT WILL NOTE THERE ARE THREE

MEN AND FIVE WOMEN.

I WOULD HAVE PREFERRED TO HAVE FOUR

WOMEN AND FOUR MEN.

SHE WAS SIMPLY THE WOMAN WHOM I LIKED

THE LEAST AT THAT PARTICULAR POINT IN THE PROCESS.
JUDGE YOUNG:

ALL RIGHT.

AND THE SECOND CHALLENGE!

AS TO YOUR EXERCISING YOUR FOURTH PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE AS
TO JUROR NO. 19, SYLVIA RESENDEZ?
MR. COPE:

AGAIN, THAT'S VERY SIMILAR, YOUR HONOR

IT WAS APPARENT TO ME THAT AT THAT POINT WE WERE GOING TO
HAVE MS. RESENDEZ, MS. SHELLEY AND MS. POULSON AND I COULD
TAKE ONE OF THESE THREE AND MS. RESENDEZ WAS THE ONE WHO,
FOR WHATEVER REASON, WAS LEAST LIKELY TO BE THE TYPE OF
JUROR THAT I WANTED.

ONCE AGAIN, I WAS TRYING TO TAKE A

WOMAN RATHER THAN A MAN SINCE IT WAS NOW DOWN TO THE POINT
WHERE THE ONLY WAY WE COULD HAVE A BALANCED PANEL IS IF
THE DEFENSE COUNSEL TOOK A WOMAN ON THEIR LAST PEREMPTORY
CHALLENGE.

I DECIDED THAT I LIKED MS. SHELLEY AND MS.

POULSON BETTER THAN I LIKED MS. RESENDEZ, ALTHOUGH, I MUST
ADMIT I WAS A LITTLE 8IT WORRIED ABOUT THIS COUSIN OF MS.
SHELLEY WHO WAS ACCUSED OF MURDER.

I DON'T KNOW HOW THAT

WAS RESOLVED, ONLY THAT IT WAS RESOLVED.

I CERTAINLY HOPE

THAT HE WASN'T ACQUITTED AND SHE THINKS HE'S GUILTY, OR
CONVICTED AND SHE THINKS HE'S INNOCENT, OR SOMETHING LIKE
THAT.

BUT I PREFERRED MS. SHELLEY, WHO, FROM APPEARANCE

SAKE, APPEARS TO BE FROM A MINORITY GROUP, BY THE WAY, EVEN

76
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CANNOT FIND THE EXERCISE OF CHALLENGES 3 AND *f WERE, IN
ANY WAY, RACIALLY MOTIVATED IN ANY RESPECT AND I DON'T
BELIEVE THAT THE LAW REQUIRES THAT ONE LEAVE ON RACIALLY
— A PERSON OF MINORITY RACE, AS AN OBLIGATION.

I THINK

WHAT IT DOES IS IT ALLOWS SOMEONE TO EXERCISE THEIR CHALLENGE]
AS TO THE INDIVIDUAL.
IN THE EXERCISE.

AND I DON'T FIND ANY RACIAL MOTIVATION]

MR. COPE HAS INDICATED HE EXERCISED IT

BY BALANCE.
I, PREVIOUS TO THIS, HAD SAID THAT IT APPEARED
10 I TO ME THAT MS. SHELLEY WAS AS LIKELY TO BE A MINORITY, OR
I!

FROM A MINORITY RACE, AS MS. RESENDEZ, AND MRS. GOMEZ WAS

12

ABOUT THE ONLY ONE THAT APPEARED TO BE ASSURED OF A MINORITY

13

RACE.

M

C H A L L E N G E S IN A N Y WAY IMPROPERLY A N D T H E C H A L L E N G E OF T H E

15

D E F E N S E IS D E N I E D .

1«
'7 I

SO I D O N ' T F I N D THAT THE STATE HAS E X E R C I S E D THEIR

M S . LOY:

THANK Y O U .

(WHEREUPON, THE MOTIONS WERE CONCLUDED).

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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IN-COURT JURY SELECTION (CONTINUED)

li ni i n il
I If A T
ill-

lliHVt

BEbN

ni i

iHSCUSSED

l U U WHO H A V F

BEEN

I II IIII I
OU'VF

f i n ni mi mi

M

111 mi ni mi

10 I BAMBER'J

SFIFCTED

II III II II II

II i il

H II

MAI

TO S I AND

l

i in

mi hi
II III 1IIl

1 A J U A (, P II I I

AS J U R f i h

II

I III

»

II I I I

AMNIO
IP 'UNI L

IHA I

SELECTED?

JT

i.c

I mo i 1 1 1 in in

,.;c

««,..,

AKtr\

vnn

'•*''

U A \ / C ppr?

STERED THE

)A " *
r.K

OF

v

"""

~~~

*

-

-• * -

••

CIPATI*

. r.KK».,w , . a ^ r - , PLEASE RETURN

NOW

*-»"*• ' ^ ' M "

~HE JURY

^N

AND

THE
I II II I I II ! III Ill III1
BOX

BECAUSE:

v/UAN

RECORD

Il II II

lul II II II

THOSE.

r%h\ \

T ti i

A C /

Il

LHAIK:>

HE

vnii

ORDER

3dA'

SHOULD
III

-

. Ar.~:*)Rr- -.

SFAT

LtAvb

**<-

i

III

S H I Ilil

II I I 01 IRS ,

ill" A I II In Ill II II

ARt f Ul; 0

II H I

ILLA'l k

BAIL,

IS

10

\

OR O f h1 0 I : III 11

II I II II III' II

'

"I Ill

III11
I I II II II

MAKE ADJUSTMENTS

THAI ARF APPROPRIATE SO YOU'LL BE COMFORT

in H I I-

II 11IIJ . 1 1 1 II

dMIi

V I

V II II II

11 1 II 111

Ill

DELIGHTED TO HAVE YOU P A K M L l P A l b

11 OO I

I III

I

Wir

I'll

NNIO OIIHERS AS MEMBERS

79

